Realpolitik knows no bounds. On Thursday, Nov. 16, the U. S. Senate passed a bill allowing the exportation of nuclear fuel and technology to India. The House passed a similar bill in July of this year; the two pieces of legislation must now be reconciled before the new Congress is called in January.
But was the deal in the best interests of India and the United States? Many American and Indian non-proliferation experts charge that it is in direct opposition to the world’s efforts to curb nuclear proliferation; giving India special treatment only eight years after it tested nuclear bombs outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is tantamount to rewarding it, they say. Conversely, others, especially Indian nuclear scientists, criticize it as a cap on India’s bomb-making capabilities, preventing it from achieving a “credible minimum deterrent.” Still other Indians are concerned with their government’s framing of the deal. Manmohan Singh, India’s prime minister, has praised the deal as a “permanent reconciliation” with America. Mr Singh’s ruling coalition, however, contains a number of leftist and Communist parties. It is they who are concerned with the potential loss to India’s historical non-alignment.
President Bush justifies the deal on the grounds that it creates a new “strategic partnership” with India, an increasingly important nation in several ways. India has ties to and influence on Iran, China and Russia, three worrisome countries in Asia. It is an economic powerhouse and a potential check on an increasingly active China.
Certain steps remain before the uranium can flow. In order to allow the export of fuel and technology to India, America must amend its own laws, specifically certain provisions of the Atomic Energy Act that prevent the U.S. from engaging in nuclear trade with countries that have not signed the NPT. The 44-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, a consortium of countries designed to watch over nuclear trade, must then be convinced to approve an “India-sized hole” in the regulation and agree on international safeguards. They would do well to be wary. Russia has already taken advantage of the state of flux and supplied fuel to two Indian reactors, bolstering the case of those who say that a nuclear free-for-all could result if India is given an exception.
Pragmatic politics has its uses and indeed is, in most cases, more beneficial than foreign policy drawn along strict ideological lines. When dealing with controversial international issues, though, some measure of steadfastness is necessary. Hypocrisy and exceptionalism are undesirable. Pragmatism still rules international relations; along this line there are substantial reasons as to why the deal bodes ill for the nuclear community.
The most problematic part of making exceptions is deciding where to draw the line. Bush argues that India is a strategically important economic and political partner. This is true. But what about India’s historic antagonist, Pakistan? It broke the rules at the same time and in much the same way as India, and President Pervez Musharraf is a critical ally in the war on terror. If India is to get an exception and forgiveness for its flouting of the NPT, then it seems that Pakistan has an equally strong case. Yet such blanket amnesties are inherently dangerous, especially in a region with such conflicting loyalties and loose rule of law.
These aspects are related to another concern of critics of the deal. Despite its perceived non-alignment, India has maintained strong military ties with Iran and refuses to reconsider them. Though India is unlikely to share nuclear technology with Iran on an official level, the case of Dr. A. Q. Khan demonstrates what can happen in a loosely governed third-world country that holds nuclear technology. Khan was a Pakistani nuclear scientist who is now under house arrest in Islamabad. The Pakistani government admitted, after much delay, that he sold nuclear secrets and technology to Iranian officials in Tehran, Kuala Lumpur, and Karachi. Given India’s equally strong ties and geographical proximity to Iran, the possibility of something similar happening and being tacitly approved by the nuclear community is frightening.
Singh is now pressuring Bush to convince Congress to take any hostile language or oversight clauses out of the final reconciled bill. It should not. If India is to be given an exception, which ideally it should not get, it must be overseen by the NSG, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and whichever countries undertake nuclear transactions with India. If the ideals of non-proliferation are going to fall to realpolitik, there must be some semblance of responsibility among those who possess that most dangerous of technologies.
About the author: John is a first-year accounting, international studies, and economics major. He can be reached at [email protected].
