It is my sentiment that a professional presentation of theism is not being brought to light in the recent discussions regarding the philosophy of religion. I hope to discuss arguments regarding contemporary philosophy of religion, and ultimately argue that the probability of theism is high. But first I will address the main competing world view to theism, via naturalism. Naturalism (the most common form of atheism in the academy) is basically the view that there are no supernatural beings, such as God. Another way to describe naturalism is to say that the universe is all that ever was, all that is and all that ever will be, as Carl Sagan puts it. Hence, if naturalism is true then theism cannot be true. Before turning to arguments for theism, which in turn gives us reason for thinking that naturalism is false, I wish to first argue directly against naturalism.
Alvin Plantinga (a world-renowned Notre Dame philosopher) has developed an ‘evolutionary argument against naturalism,’ EAAN for short. But before we look at the argument, it is imperative to understand that this argument does not argue against evolution in any way. This is not an ‘intelligent design’ argument. Furthermore, I must be explicitly clear that I endorse the current evolutionary ‘theory’ (though it is no longer really a theory) and do not see, as a theist, any good reason to necessarily hold to a fundamentalist interpretation of the Bible. Hence, I have no desire to quarrel over such fundamentalist issues. I will now argue, via Plantinga, belief in evolution is a problem for the naturalist rather than the theist.
Given that the evolutionary development of our cognitive faculties aims primarily at survival (as opposed to truth or reliability), then given the truth of naturalism, we have a defeater for the belief that our cognitive faculties are reliable-i.e., that they aim at truth. However, if we have a defeater for our belief that our cognitive faculties are reliable, then we have a defeater for our belief in the truth of evolutionary naturalism because this belief is itself produced by our cognitive faculties. Thus, if evolutionary naturalism is true, then it is positively irrational to believe that evolutionary naturalism (or simply naturalism, which is the relevant belief at hand) is true.
The argument may be formulated as follows:
(1) If evolutionary naturalism is correct, then our cognitive faculties aim at survival-conducive beliefs rather than truth-conducive beliefs.
(2) If our cognitive faculties aim at survival-conducive beliefs rather than truth-conducive beliefs, then our belief that naturalism is correct (which is the product of our cognitive faculties) is a survival-conducive belief rather than a truth-conducive belief.
(3) If our belief that naturalism is correct (which is the product of our cognitive faculties) is a survival-conducive belief rather than a truth-conducive belief, then the likelihood of naturalism is either low or essentially unknowable.
(4) If the likelihood of naturalism is either low or essentially unknowable, then it is irrational to think that naturalism is correct (and naturalism should not be believed).
(5) Therefore, if evolutionary naturalism is correct, then it is irrational to think that naturalism is correct (and naturalism should not be believed). [From 1 and 4]
The theist, on the other hand, may adopt some sort of intelligence-guided evolution. And this brings us to one of the main objections against this argument. One might reply to Plantinga’s EAAN by saying that the evolutionary processes apply selectional pressure in favor of those that have true beliefs rather than false beliefs. Therefore, we have evolved cognitive faculties that can be considered reliable-because the unreliable cognitive structures were killed off by natural selection. However, this objection misses the very point of Plantinga’s argument, via that naturalistic evolution selects for beliefs that are survival conducive-irrespective of truth or falsehood, and there are a potentially infinite number of false beliefs which can be survival conducive (consequently, there are a potentially infinite many more false beliefs than true ones which may be selected for survival). There are further objections to the argument but we will have to suffice with one, at least for now.
One thing that must be mentioned in regards to this argument is that the epistemology (or theory of knowledge) adopted by Plantinga is an externalist epistemology. This means that having a justified or rational belief is not a matter of knowing what it is that justifies one’s belief. Externalist epistemology is arguably the prevalent view in the academy.
However, there is another form of epistemology (the more plausible one, in my opinion) called internalism which states that the justification for one’s belief must be known (or be capable of being known) by the person with the justified belief. As mentioned earlier, although Plantinga has an externalist view of epistemology, which seems to be relevant to the argument, it is not obvious that Plantinga’s EAAN does not hold up even with an internalist view of epistemology.
I think one can turn the argument into a good inductive argument against naturalism rather than show naturalism to be self-defeating from an internalist perspective. Unfortunately, space inhibits further discussion on this. But regardless, even if an internalist epistemology escapes the grips of Plantinga’s argument, next time I will present another ‘self-defeating’ argument against naturalism which is inherently internalist. Thus, we will see that no matter what view of epistemology one holds, naturalism will be seen to be nothing more than an irrational muddle.
Jesse Cohen is a junior philosophy and religious studies double major. He can be reached for comment at [email protected].
