On Feb. 8, the two leading political factions of Palestine, Fatah and Hamas, reached a power-sharing agreement after eight months of political in-fighting and militia clashes that killed 130 people.

The hope is that, after one destructive year, these two parties have reached an agreement that will end the bloodshed and convince the Quartet, consisting of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and Russia, to lift the economic sanctions against the Palestinian government.

Unfortunately, it seems that the latter objective has fallen by the wayside.

Almost one year ago, Hamas seized power in an election that saw Fatah lose its former political dominance. Hamas’s policies and officials threatened to undo all the progress, small though it was, that Fatah had made toward détente with Israel, as well as undermining various domestic policies Fatah had put in place.

The two factions consequently had a falling out, resulting in international economic sanctions against the Hamas-led government and violent clashes in the Gaza Strip between militants of Hamas and Fatah.

The conference on Thursday was hosted by the Saudi government in Mecca, Islam’s holiest city, in a Saudi palace overlooking the Kaaba, Islam’s holiest shrine. The symbolism was clearly intentional, designed to pressure Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, head of Fatah, and Khaled Mashaal, the exiled leader of Hamas, into forming an agreement for a coalition government. This they did; Hamas received nine Cabinet positions, Fatah six, and various other factions will receive four seats.

The Saudi Arabian government also promised $1 billion in aid, sorely needed as many Palestinian civil service workers have been without paychecks in months. This is due to the international sanctions by the Quartet. As part of various aid agreements, the individual members of the Quartet used to pay hundreds of millions of dollars to the beleaguered Palestinian government to help pay the bills.

This aid stipulated that the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the party in control of the government during Yasser Arafat’s reign, continue to recognize Israel and participate in international summits and conferences.

When Hamas came to power, it refused to recognize Israel and renounce violence as a political tool, the two core tenets of the 1993 Oslo accords. This prompted the sanctions.

The new agreement does not explicitly plan for any of those problems. The document only agreed to divvy up Cabinet posts and form a coalition government. It did not contain any promises from Hamas to adhere to previous PLO agreements with Israel, nor did it address the issue of renouncing violence and recognizing Israel.

This is a shame.

It is wonderful that the two sides agreed on a cease-fire, but they have overlooked the most important issue by far.

Fatah and Hamas are ultimately in disagreement because of their differing beliefs on the issue of a Palestinian state, recognition of Israel, and the use of violence as a political tool. Fatah has long said that it would agree to a Palestinian state based on the pre-1967 borders in return for complete withdrawal of Israeli troops. Hamas has explicitly come out against such an agreement.

They have also repeatedly stated their support of intifada methods as a tool to pressure Israel. The agreement is merely a stopgap measure; as long as these two differing political philosophies exist, there will be conflict between Hamas and Fatah, bloodshed, and no end to the Israeli-Palestinian troubles.

The lion’s share of the blame lies with Hamas. Its utter rigidity in its policies toward Israel and its support for violence are at fault for the current situation. True, two intifadas did occur under Fatah, but because of the PLO’s acceptance of, if not strict adherence to, the Camp David and Oslo accords, there was always hope that a breakthrough could be achieved.

No such hope exists under Hamas, which is why the Quartet is crossing their fingers that the new agreement will allow Fatah’s ministers to be a moderating influence in the Hamas-dominated government. Whether such hopes are founded or not is yet to be seen.

If anything can be pulled from the past several decades’ experience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, though, it is this: A little bit of talk is good, as long as it leads to a lot more action.

About the writer:

John is a first-year international studies, economics and finance major. He can be reached at [email protected].