The European Union Constitution was unexpectedly killed off by two negative referendums, one French and one Dutch, in the summer of 2005. Now, though, as the Germans assume the rotating presidency of the EU, Chancellor Angela Merkel has made it her priority to revive the constitution, claiming that the yearlong “pause for reflection” is over.
The “pause for reflection” always was somewhat of a damp squib; it was meant more as a recovery time for those EU leaders too shocked to continue consideration of the issue. Over the last year and a half, there has been much more pausing than reflecting on the issue of the constitution. After the French and Dutch rejections and subsequent refusals by other countries to hold further referendums, the European political elite shifted the conversation from internal to external matters: the Union initiated accession talks with Turkey and Croatia, increased its diplomatic presence in the Balkans, and (somewhat) forged a common foreign policy in Lebanon and elsewhere.
Now, though, with no consensus emerging on Turkey’s accession talks (by far the most controversial possible addition), Europeans are turning to the constitution in hopes of some substantial progress over the next year or so. They may find this progress aggravatingly elusive.
European “federalists” or “integrationists,” as they are often known, have long argued for an “ever closer union” of European states, sharing common policies on agriculture, foreign affairs, the environment, free speech and so forth. Many of Europe’s leaders have been and continue to be professed federalists. Consequently, when the constitution was rejected in 2005, they refused to believe that all their hard work had come to naught. Denial is a river in Africa.
One must feel sympathy for them since many of the reasons the voters said “no” had nothing at all to do with the constitution itself; very few had a complete understanding of the text and its ramifications. The disapproval is almost certainly symptomatic of a wider dissatisfaction with the European project as a whole. The problem is no one can agree on precisely why the voters rejected the document. The French and Dutch governments were very unpopular at the time of the referendum, and the “no” camp took advantage of this. They also played on fears of globalization and attendant worries about Europe’s economy, angst about absorbing more “low-wage countries” from the east, and opposition to economic liberalization.
So if Europe’s leaders are proposing to resurrect the constitution, they must think some of these problems have been addressed. Proponents point out that elections in France and the Netherlands are coming up later this year. By that time, various constitutional issues could be resolved and a new opinion could form along with new governments (so they say). Yet no French or Dutch leaders, current or future, are proposing revisiting the constitution in a new referendum, and as The Economist says, “there is something undemocratic about asking electorates to endorse a text and, when they deliver a resounding no, asking them again.”
The other problems still remain as well. Economic liberalization is still taboo, especially in France; Bulgaria and Romania are set to join later this year, propagating more fears of low-wage competition; and the thorny issue of Turkey is even more prominent now than it was during the referendums.
Another obstacle still remains. During bullish economic periods, voters might be tempted into trying something new while they are experiencing a sense of security. But with the exception of the UK, Ireland and Spain, the EU’s economies look as dismal as ever. This feeds a wider pessimism that influences opinions on pan-EU political issues, especially ones that influence the economies, such as immigration policy or agricultural rebates. Economic performance remains a national responsibility, yet, as seen from the 2005 votes, it is still a predominant factor in voter opinion.
Finally, perhaps the biggest hindrance to the EU constitution and the European project as a whole is a lack of purpose. EU proponents are divided into several camps based on their view of “an ever-closer union.” There are those who wish to create large European institutions that churn out policy, legislatively tying Europe together, and there are those who see the EU growing more organically, with institutions possibly evolving from those processes. Some want to see the various countries more as a United States of Europe, acting as one nation-state with a common policy on everything from foreign affairs to justice to banking, while still others see the EU more as a marriage of convenience for various national pursuits. This problem alone virtually guarantees further gridlock on any constitution, revived or otherwise. Until Europe’s hopefuls resolve this fundamental question, little else can hope to be accomplished.
About the writer:
John Jose is a first-year finance, international studies and economics major. He can be reached at [email protected].
